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The profession of law enforcement carries inherent dangers and operations such 
as planned arrests of known violent offenders increases the dangers substantially.  To 
mitigate these increased risks, operations need to be planned and executed considering 
the safety of all parties involved as well as legal, moral, and ethical standards.  Tactical 
teams have regularly employed dynamic entry tactics for conducting these types of 
operations (Aaron, n.d. a).  These tactics are often indiscriminately applied to 
circumstances that do not justify the risk to the officers and citizens involved in the 
operations (Howe & Pacillas, 2009).  According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted report, 25 of the 231 law enforcement 
officers who were feloniously killed, and 103 of the officers assaulted in the line of duty 
between 2013 and 2017 suffered their injuries in tactical situations including high-risk 
entries (FBI, 2018).  Additionally, a minimum of 81 civilians were killed by police in 
dynamic warrant service operations from in a similar time frame (Sack, 2017). 
Law enforcement units tasked with high risk search and arrest operations should 
limit the application of dynamic entry tactics to situations where innocent people are at 
risk of serious injury or death.  High risk search and arrest operations by their very 
nature carry with them a higher degree of danger to both officers and citizens.  Each 
year officers and citizens end up as casualties in these types of operations.  The 
employment of dynamic entry tactics as the first, and sometimes sole, tactical solution 
to high risk search and arrest operations undoubtedly increases that danger.  Planning 
and use of alternate tactics can reduce the deadly risk to officers and civilians while still 
preserving the intent of the mission. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The profession of law enforcement carries inherent dangers, and few would 
argue that conducting a hostage rescue is a much greater risk than an officer’s day to 
day duties.  There is an obvious risk from the hostage taker, but often underestimated is 
the risk created by the tactics used and how they are applied.  Tactical teams accept 
higher risk in the situation of hostage rescue because of the necessity of the mission at 
hand, to save a life (Clark, 2009). 
For decades, many agencies accomplished the majority of their high-risk search 
and arrest warrant operations through the application of dynamic entries based on 
hostage rescue tactics (Aaron, n.d.a).  Many high-risk operations are conducted with 
limited information about suspects and/or the environment.  Sometimes the suspect is 
known and has an articulable propensity for violence or access to weapons.  Nearly 
always the operation is conducted in an area that is familiar to the suspect and is 
virtually unknown to the officers.  Despite the increased risks, law enforcement tactical 
units still routinely employ dynamic entry tactics based on hostage rescue or rapid 
deployment training to conduct high risk search and arrest warrant operations (Clark, 
2009).  While there is no way to know the exact number of high-risk warrant operations 
conducted through dynamic tactics, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) asserts 
that in their survey of 260 law enforcement agencies conducted in 2013, “The majority 
(79 percent) of SWAT deployments the ACLU studied were for the purpose of executing 
a search warrant, most commonly in drug investigations” (ACLU, 2014). 
 The early theory on high risk warrant operations was that to be successful, 
teams had to enter and “flood” the house with officers as quickly as possible.  It was 
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thought that this rapid violent entry would mentally overwhelm the suspects and 
interrupt their thought process. This would in turn allow the officers enough time to 
detain the suspects before they could flee, retaliate, or destroy evidence (Aaron, n.d.b).  
Law enforcement units tasked with high risk search and arrest warrant operations 
should limit the application of dynamic entry tactics to situations where innocent people 
are at risk of serious injury or death.  While dynamic entry will always be a viable tactic 
for particular situations, there are other options available to teams conducting high risk 
warrant operations.  These alternate tactics can reduce the deadly risk to officers and 
civilians while still preserving the intent of the mission.   
POSITION 
The practice of arbitrarily employing hostage rescue-based tactics when other 
viable options exist, exposes officers and citizens to unnecessary danger.  The hazard 
created by the overuse of dynamic entry tactics has been noticed and addressed by the 
National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA), the organization that publishes the 
Tactical Response and Operations Standard that serves as a voluntary best practice 
guide for tactical units.  In his 2010 message to organization members on the issue of 
using dynamic tactics for warrant operations, former NTOA Chairman Phil Hansen 
wrote, “Year after year, I have seen good police officers killed and wounded in the line 
of duty while utilizing dynamic entry as a “one size fits all” solution, without the element 
of surprise, and without a mission that supports its use” (Hansen, 2010, p.2 para. 6).  
Hansen’s declaration is substantiated by the 2017 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) report.  According to the 
report, 25 of the 231 law enforcement officers who were feloniously killed, and 103 of 
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the officers assaulted in the line of duty between 2013 and 2017 suffered their injuries in 
tactical situations which includes high-risk entries.  The only two single circumstances 
with a higher number of officers feloniously killed are premeditated attacks at 45 and 
investigating suspicious circumstances and persons at 34 (FBI, 2018).  Currently there 
are no government vetted statistics to indicate the number of citizens killed or injured by 
police, the FBI will begin to collect and disseminate that information in 2019 (FBI, 2018, 
November 20).  In the meantime, however, Sack (2017) estimated with the aid of open 
record requests, that a minimum of 81 civilians were killed by police in dynamic warrant 
service operations over the seven-year period covered by his research, from 2010 to 
2016. 
High risk search and arrest operations by their very nature carry with them a 
higher degree of danger to both officers and citizens.  Each year officers and citizens 
end up as casualties in these types of operations.  The employment of dynamic entry 
tactics as the first, and sometimes sole, tactical solution to high risk search and arrest 
operations undoubtedly increases that danger.   
In addition to Hansen’s letter, the NTOA has included several independent 
articles in their periodical publication The Tactical Edge over the years describing the 
use of dynamic entry tactics for search and arrest warrants.  However, the organization 
has never endorsed it as the only tactic for these operations nor has the tactic been 
authoritatively condemned by the group.  The NTOA instead maintains that the 
circumstances of each situation should be assessed on its own merits and the most 
reasonable tactic should be chosen based on that assessment (Hansen, 2010). 
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The misuse of aggressive dynamic tactics to conduct search and arrest warrant 
operations can present an abusive appearance to the public.  There is no question that 
law enforcement in a democratic society such as the United States is only able to police 
the citizens to the level that they will allow.   If the citizenry does not believe in the 
mission or accept the tactics used to accomplish the mission, they will not sanction the 
law enforcement actions.  Citizens will typically be more acceptant of actions by law 
enforcement that seems to them to be fair or just and critical of those that do not seem 
to be (Moule, Parry, & Fox, 2019).  Related to the public’s acceptance of these tactics is 
the issue of police militarization.  According to Koslicki (2017) “There has been growing 
concern that the police institution in the USA has been growing increasingly more 
militaristic in its appearance, behavior, culture, and function” (p.1 para.1).  This belief 
is only hardened when a police SWAT team forces entry into someone’s home in 
the name of drug enforcement (Koslicki, 2017). 
Tactical teams have to remain cognizant of public opinion of their tactics.  The 
majority of society will accept the everyday business of law enforcement so long as it 
appears to them to be fair and just.  Once the tactics employed by police begin to seem 
abusive public outcry will mandate changes. 
COUNTER ARGUMENTS 
 Proponents of using dynamic entries for warrant operations often refer to the 
“surprise, speed and domination” of the entry as the key to its success, and they point to 
the uncountable number of dynamic operations that have been conducted without 
injuries or deaths (French, 2010).  Tracey (1994) goes a step further with his opinion 
and states that “speed for safety and recovery of evidence is essential” (para. 1).  These 
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result driven arguments are based on the premise that because a tactic has been 
successful in the past it must be the right way in all cases.  It is very likely that the 
overwhelming majority of operations, even those we deem to be high risk, involve the 
majority of the population who are not willing to engage in a deadly gun battle with 
police in any situation (Danaher, 2014).  In addition, the application of speed to an 
already dangerous situation is often contrary to safety.  According to Clark (2009) 
“Throughout the United States, sound instructors in the area of unknown and high-risk 
search warrants preach and practice: The higher the danger, the slower your speed of 
execution” (para. 15). 
Howe & Pacillas (2009) contend that teams can employ breach and hold tactics 
when the evidence is pertinent to a case and easily destroyed.  In this type of tactic, the 
teams would breach key points of a structure in order to locate the suspect and control 
his movements from outside the structure.  When executed quickly enough and 
aggressively enough this tactic accomplishes some of the goals of the dynamic entry 
such as surprising the suspect and affecting his decision process.  It also allows the 
team to establish control of most of the structure without ever having set foot inside.  
Once the occupants have been located and pinned in place by this tactic there is little 
risk of destruction of evidence or opportunity for the suspect to retrieve a weapon.  
Depending on the layout of the structure the team can then call the suspect out to one 
of the breach points or conduct a slow methodical search to each occupant location to 
take them into custody. 
Concerned that teams are too often improperly using dynamic entry tactics, 
Howe & Pacillas (2009) caution that operation planners should conduct their planning 
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from a neutral position.  They offer the opinion that engaging in a gun fight in close 
quarters with a determined suspect in his own environment is not ideal.  The best option 
is to place the suspect in an unfamiliar situation that he is not prepared for.  Safety 
priorities must be applied to every potential operation, in order to determine the correct 
tactic for the situation (Hansen, 2010).  Off the cuff mission planning, particularly in 
missions planned by detectives who are personally invested in an investigation, often 
fails to apply these priorities and items such as drugs and money “creep” above the 
safety of people involved (Davis, 2007). 
 Others contend that using SWAT teams to conduct high risk warrant operations 
keeps the team active and hones their skills that can be transferred to other operations 
where innocent lives are at stake (NTOA, 1988).  While using SWAT for these 
operations does provide experience, the deployment of a tactical team is subject to 
judicial review just as any other use of force.  Law enforcement agencies have to be 
able to justify SWAT team deployments and the selection of tactics as objectively 
reasonable.  The courts will assess these actions based on the totality of circumstances 
and it is possible that the use of dynamic tactics could be deemed unreasonable if there 
is not a defensible reason to use them (Ryan, 2007). 
RECOMMENDATION 
The use of dynamic entry tactics for operations when there is no credible 
articulable threat to hostages or bystanders puts officers and citizens at undue risk and 
should be restricted to those instances where innocent lives are endangered.  When the 
mission is evaluated and is found to be anything other than preserving the lives of 
imperiled innocent people who are incapable to removing themselves from danger, then 
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something other than dynamic entry as a tactical option should be considered.  The 
objective of these types of missions do not typically support the use of dynamic entry. 
Champions of dynamic entry-based warrant operation tactics proclaim that the 
use of the quick, aggressive entry is the only way to preserve the safety of officers and 
citizens and to guard against the destruction of evidence in these operations.  While 
dynamic entry is recognized as a possible option, more than a few nationally recognized 
experts in the field of special weapons and tactics advocate for evaluating each mission 
individually and arriving at the best tactical solution for that mission’s objective (Clark, 
2009).  They also speak heavily of understanding the increased risk that comes from 
the use of dynamic entry tactics and warn against its overuse as the gold standard tactic 
for high-risk scenarios (Hansen, 2010). 
 Another perspective is that the use of SWAT teams in these situations keeps the 
team sharp and provides real word experiences that cannot be simulated in training 
scenarios.  The deployment of SWAT and other tactical teams to serve warrants will be 
judged by courts to be a use of force, and an objectively reasonable person would not 
justify any other use of force by the same logic. They will instead be evaluated on the 
circumstances of the case (Ryan, 2007).      
A significant portion of the SWAT team deployments, according to a 2013 survey, 
were related to narcotics cases (ACLU, 2014).  Historically tactical teams have 
predominantly employed dynamic entry tactics for conducting high risk warrant 
operations.  In the early years of deploying and using tactical teams, it became standard 
to use dynamic entry tactics to overcome the dangers of the operation with the 
application of fast and aggressive tactics.  These tactics were meant to distract and 
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overwhelm dangerous suspects and arrest them before they could respond violently.  
Through years of trial and error, teams have started rethinking their response to these 
operations.  Often the information for the operation was inadequate for the mission and 
tactics were poorly chosen based on that meager information (Aaron, n.d.b).    
While there is obvious increased risk with the use of dynamic tactics their 
employment is sometimes useful when there is a credible necessity to justify that risk 
(Clark, 2009).  Tactical teams will accept greater risks to save people from imminent 
danger.  To determine when these risks are acceptable the safety priorities have to be 
applied to the situation (Hansen, 2010).  Safety priorities categorize people by their 
proximity to imminent harm and their ability to remove themselves from the dangerous 
environment (NTOA, 2018).  When missions are planned with too much haste by people 
with a vested personal interest, the safety priorities are sometimes disregarded and the 
desire to save evidence takes a precedence to the safety of people (Davis, 2007). 
According to Hansen (2010) the NTOA has neither endorsed nor sanctioned the 
use of dynamic entry tactics for high-risk warrant service operations.  The NTOA’s 
official position is that each operation should be subjected to a planning process to 
determine the safest tactic relative to the mission.  He does include that dynamic entry 
should not be the only tactic that is considered (Hansen, 2010).  Applying the safety 
priorities to many of the warrant service missions, it does not make sense that teams 
use dynamic entries to force officers into a structure that is believed to be controlled and 
occupied by a person that has been deemed to be dangerous (Clark, 2009).   
Tactical teams conducting high-risk warrant operations should employ a 
standardized planning process that accesses each situation differently and explores all 
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of the tactical options available.  The plans must at least include some mechanism for 
evaluating the risk posed by the suspect and an analysis of the risk weighed with the 
safety priorities.  The tactical community has long considered mission planning to be 
critical to the success of any operation, and serving high risk warrants is no exception.  
Teams planning these warrant operations should follow a framework that outlines 
important information.  That outline should include such things as the mission and 
objective of the operation, logistics such as vehicles and equipment to be used, the 
tactics to be used and contingency planning to address what to do if things go wrong 
(Kolman, 1983). 
Operation planning does not have to be difficult.  It can be simplified and 
structured through the use of checklists, risk assessments matrix, and operation plans 
that address the most commonly needed information.  These pre made planning 
documents can be stored digitally to facilitate a formal planning process for meticulously 
planned operations when early notice is provided or kept in a notebook in the field to 
allow expedient planning in developing situations. 
The Texarkana, Texas Police Department SWAT team developed a “work book” 
that includes the basic information needed to initiate a plan upon deployment (Appendix 
A).  When the team is called to deploy, planning immediately begins and the same 
process is followed regardless of who is assigned to lead the planning.  The workbook 
helps the planner see what tasks have been completed and what tasks need to be 
delegated.  The foremost theme in the mission planning, and the first page of the 
workbook, is “Apply the Safety Priorities”.  The best tactical solution for an operation 
cannot be selected without applying the safety priorities.  The planner uses a risk 
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assessment matrix that is nationally recognized to evaluate the threat of the suspect to 
determine if a SWAT teams should conduct the operation or if it can be performed by an 
investigative unit such as a drug task force or detective group. In some cases, it may 
recommend that a SWAT command be consulted for advice or as a backup unit. 
In addition, the work book contains two checklists for high risk warrant 
operations.  One is a general task checklist for pre briefing and briefing tasks.  The 
other is a scouting or reconnaissance checklist used to obtain information about the 
target location.  The final portion is the operation plan outline.  The operation outline can 
stand alone as the operation plan or it can be used when time allows to create a 
detailed written plan.  Photographs of suspects, houses, sketches, or maps can be 
attached to the plan to provide more detail to the team(s) carrying out the operation.  
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